There has been a long history of discussion on the usefulness of formal methods in legal settings.
formal decision theory. In particular, we are interested in cases where the stakes are high -as they are in many legal decisions -and how uncertainty resulting from foundational problems in statistics impacts upon such decisions.
The Reference-Class Problem
Let us start with an example illustrating the reference-class problem. Consider the population of people in the USA. We wish to know the probability of a given person contracting a particular form of cancer, lung cancer, say. Partition the population into males and females and we get one answer for the probability in question. Partition again into smokers and non-smokers and we get a different answer. Partition again into those exposed to asbestos and those not so exposed, or by geographic region and so on, and we typically get different answers each time. We can even partition into seemingly irrelevant classes, such as people with more than one vowel in their surname and those with only one vowel, and we will get another answer. Despite some of these reference classes seeming to be relevant and some not, there is no principled way to establish the relevance of a reference class. And even if we were able to settle that issue, there is typically more than one relevant reference class (smokers and geographic region, for instance, in the above example). The best we can do, it seems, is to give conditional probabilities as partial answers to our original question. Instead of providing the probability of the individual in question getting lung cancer, we instead provide conditional probabilities for the individual in question contracting lung cancer, given that the individual in question is male/female, smoker/non-smoker, etc. 3 How is this relevant to the use of statistical methods (and formal methods generally) in legal decision making? To see the connection, we revisit the case of Shonubi. 4 In this 3 A. Hájek, 'The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too ' (2007) 156 Synthese 563.
case, Nigerian citizen Charles Shonubi was convicted of smuggling heroin into Kennedy Airport in New York. It was determined that he had made seven drug-smuggling trips prior to his arrest. Sentencing for such crimes is, in part, determined by the total quantity of drugs smuggled. The District Court interpreted this to include Shonubi's prior trips, so sentenced him based on the total quantity of drugs in his possession on the trip when he was apprehended, combined with an estimate of the quantity of heroin smuggled on the seven prior trips for which he had not been formally charged. In an earlier paper on this topic, 7 we argued that: (i) the reference-class problem raises serious difficulties for the reliability of the estimated probability that Shonubi smuggled specific quantities of heroin on the seven prior trips; and (ii) this uncertainty has ramifications when we consider the problem in its proper context: as a decision theory problem. Let us say a little about each of these points, starting with the statistical issues. whether Shonubi is a member of the reference classes in question -he is certainly a member of both classes, and many more besides. Rather, the issue is that, given the different reference classes provide different answers to the probability assignment in question, there is considerable uncertainty about the probability assignment itself.
To put the point slightly differently, the probability of 0.99 assigned to Shonubi carrying at least 2,090.2 grams of heroin on his seven prior drug smuggling trips is a feature of the statistical model used. Other statistical models will give different probability assignments. We thus need either to defend the statistical model used against all others (and we see no prospect for the success of this option) or else we need to live with the resulting meta-uncertainty (uncertainty about the statistical model). This brings us to the second part of our original argument: the importance of decision theory in the face of such meta-uncertainty.
Decision Theory and Statistics
We must not forget that statistics, at best, provide justification for belief. Statistical information does not, on its own, motivate action. The question of appropriate action takes us beyond statistics and into the purview of decision theory. Statistics very often provide the probability assignments required for a decision problem but before the correct action can be decided, we also need to consider utilities. Once the probabilities and utilities have been provided, the expected utility is calculated and we are counselled to choose the action associated with the greatest expected utility (if there is such an action).
The utilities play a crucial role. To focus exclusively on statistics in a decision problem is to ignore half of what is important. And crucially, for present purposes, the sentencing in
Shonubi and other legal cases is not a purely statistical problem; it is a decision-theory problem. This important aspect of decision making, legal or otherwise, has been overlooked by some commentators. Our suggestion 9 is that, given the uncertainty over the probability assignment (due to reference-class problems) and the fact that the sentencing in this case (with its novel interpretation of the sentencing guidlines) may involve considerably harsher penalties, the cost of error needs to be considered explicitly.
The point is a simple one: when the stakes are low, we can live with extensive uncertainty, but when the stakes are high, we demand higher standards of evidence (and consequently less uncertainty).
This basic piece of decision theory lies behind the different standards of evidence usually involved in conviction (beyond reasonable doubt) and sentencing (preponderance of evidence). The stakes are usually higher in the conviction stage so we require the highest standard of evidence, whereas at sentencing the stakes are typically lower and so lower standards of evidence are acceptable. But the Shonubi case is not typical. Here the difference in sentence resulting from the court's interpretation of 'total quantity of drugs'
to include trips for which there were no convictions was considerable (about 4.5 years of jail time). This combined with the aforementioned meta-uncertainty, should result in a more precautionary attitude at sentencing. The District Court understated the level of uncertainty by failing to quantify the meta-uncertainty associated with the statistical model used. Given the high disutility of handing down an extra 4.5 year sentence, the Second Circuit appellate bench was right to demand a higher standard of evidence.
In our earlier paper we offered this argument as an -admittedly charitableinterpretation of the Second Circuit's ruling. The second circuit court did not put the case in these terms. Instead, it demanded 'specific evidence' without providing much by way
of guidance on what that might consist of. Here we will not dwell on interpretations of the appellate court's decision any further. In the rest of this article we will defend our argument and comment on recent contributions to the debate by Peter Tillers 10 and
Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo. 
Modal Fallacies, Liberal Sympathies and Inferential Arrows
Peter Tillers raises a number of interesting points in relation to our arguments. First, he suggests that we have fallen for a modal fallacy: believing that P follows from the modal proposition 'I wish that P'. 12 The suggestion is that we would like it to be the case that all 10 P. Nowhere in our discussion of reference classes do such sympathies play a role. Indeed, we deliberately turn things around and give the example of using the reference class of toll-booth operators on the George Washington Bridge as a means of establishing Shonubi's innocence, and we point out that that would be a decidedly bad defence. The bottom line is that the argument in question is statistical, not social or political.
Although Tillers does not discuss our comments on decision theory, his charge against us might have some force there. For it is in the decision-theory setting that utilities enter into the picture, and it is here that more liberal sympathies might well play a role. 14 After all, it is liberal sympathies that drive the different standards of proof in court and these same liberal sympathies drive the presumption of innocence. The idea is that Type I errorsfalse positives -are more serious (at least in the legal setting) than Type II errorsHorses', 38) that we took ourselves to have solved the reference-class problem. We state quite explicitly in our paper that we do not claim to have done this. Tillers' suggestion here is that it is always possible to draw conclusions about an individual's behaviour based on evidence gathered by others. We agree. The problem is that this evidence will depend on the reference class used. There are simply too many evidential arrows and they don't always point in the same direction! Tillers takes us to be denying that it is ever legitimate to engage in group to individual inferences: We took our target to be the thesis that in the Shonubi case, the statistical analysis as it stood supported the inference about the behaviour of Shonubi from the behaviour of the others in the reference class in question. Now of course our argument against this thesis proceeded via a general discussion of the reference-class problem, and this is (according to us) a wide-spread problem. But at no stage did we suggest that it is always a mistake to draw inferences about an individual based on statistical arguments from a population.
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Our point is that in drawing such inferences one must accept, and deal with, the resulting uncertainty. In Shonubi, this uncertainty was obscured, indeed understated, by sweeping the reference-class problem aside. 
Formal Methods and Inference to the Best Explanation
Allen and Pardo also take up the issue of the reference-class problem in legal decision making. 22 We find ourselves in broad agreement with most of what they have to say. We do not, however, share their pessimism about the use of formal methods.
Allen and Pardo suggest that the lesson of the Shonubi case and subsequent debate is that 'inferential problems at trial appear to defy formal treatment'. They come to this conclusion for several reasons. The first is the meta-uncertainty (uncertainty about the appropriate choice of reference classes, for example) that we drew attention to in our earlier paper and which we have discussed again here. A second reason for Allen and Pardo's pessimism over the prospects for formal treatments of legal inferences is the 20 Tillers again puts the point in terms of validity and invalidity ('If Wishes Were Horses', 40), but in the technical usage of this term, at least, all parties agree that the inferences in question are invalid; the issue is whether the inferences in question are good inductive inferences. 21 Tillers proceeds to argue that we 'ignored the elephant in the room' by failing to examine the Second Circuit's reference to 'specific evidence' and its failure to distinguish between evidentiary and socio-political considerations. But this is puzzling, since both issues were directly addressed conspicuous lack of clarity surrounding key terms such as 'more reliable' and the like.
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And it is this that seems to be their principal reason for pessimism:
This can be seen by flipping the Shonubi question and asking of the District Judge or his academic assistants to explain why the evidence actually provided at trial and sentencing established by a preponderance of the evidence that Shonubi imported a certain amount of drugs. No formal answer will be forthcoming to that question, and the answer ultimately will be in the form of the exercise of judgment. Precisely so, as always will be the case at trial, we suspect. Thus, the dispute between the trial and appellate courts was not a profound disagreement about probability theory or statistics but instead about the exercise of judgment over the facts of this case.
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From the discussion leading up to this passage it is clear that it is vagueness in some of the key legal terms that is the issue. Indeed, vagueness presents serious difficulties for classical logic and hence classical probability theory. 25 But classical probability theory is not the only game in town. There are various non-classical probability theories and these are much better suited to representing uncertainty due to vagueness. For example, there are various vague probability theories, which avoid the rather stringent requirement that belief be modelled by a single real-valued probability function. 26 We are not claiming that such treatments are straightforward or that they solve all the problems at hand. On the contrary, a great deal of work in philosophical logic continues on the many technical, practical and philosophical problems associated with vagueness. Our point is simply that important work is being done and progress is being made. Moreover, this work is formal.
It involves developing formal logical and probability theories that handle vagueness better than their classical counterparts. So while we agree with Allen and Pardo that vagueness presents serious obstacles to the use of formal methods in legal decisionmaking, this should not be thought to be a reason for giving up on formal methods per se, though it may well be a reason to give up on classical theories.
In place of formal methods Allen and Pardo propose 27 invoking inference to the best explanation as a way forward. They rightly point out that explanation is important in the kinds of inferences salient in legal settings, and yet explanation is by and large ignored by standard statistical analyses. An example will help. When it was found that Shonubi had multiple passports, and had made numerous overseas trips that would have been too expensive to fund on a toll-booth operator's wages, it was inferred that several of the trips in question involved illegal transportation of drugs. Indeed, something like this form of reasoning was invoked at the District Court in concluding that Shonubi had made seven prior drug-smuggling trips. Notice that there is no appeal to the frequency of drugrunners in the population of multiple passport-holders who engage in overseas travel beyond their means. The hypothesis that the seven trips in question were drug-smuggling trips, best explains the evidence in question, and that is enough. Or so the story goes. While it is clear that inference to the best explanation is widely used in both scientific and every-day inferences, 28 it is not clear that it eschews formal methods. After all, just because the inference that Shonubi made seven prior drug-smuggling trips was not based on frequency data, this does not mean that it did not involve probabilities. In our earlier paper we suggested that inferences such as these might involve subjective probabilities.
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These might be based on other subjective probabilities such as the probability that drug smugglers make multiple trips, the probability that a known drug smuggler would have other legal but invisible income, and so on. Allowing subjective probabilities in place of statistical frequencies is not, in our book, giving up on formal methods.
We also note that inference to the best explanation does not seem applicable unless there is already quite a bit of evidence available. After all, evidence that Shonubi was a drug smuggler and that drug smugglers are unlikely to have other, legal means of living beyond their visible means plays an important role in the courts' reasoning in Shonubi.
To see this, consider how poor the inference is that a randomly-chosen person with a lowpaying job, multiple passports and regular overseas trips is a drug runner. To put the point slightly differently, when the evidence is thin it may be very difficult to single out a privileged 'best' explanation, or worse still, the best explanation might be clearly unacceptable (e.g. when only one explanation is on offer). The bottom line is that sometimes we need to refrain from endorsing the best explanation. 30 Moreover, we suspect that such situations arise in many legal settings. This is not to suggest that inference to the best explanation is not useful in such settings, just that one needs to be careful with its application and aware of the difficulties associated with this controversial form of inference. But these cautions aside, Allen's and Pardo's suggestion is a good one and deserves more discussion than we have been able to provide here. 28 Although it is by no means uncontroversial. For a very good critical discussion, see B. C. van
Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Clarendon, Oxford, 1980 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to say a little about the role of reference-class evidenceevidence gathered from others (or what Tillers calls the inferential arrows) -because this is really the heart of the reference-class problem. Again, we rely on decision theory to illuminate the appropriate use of such evidence in the course of establishing guilt. We have argued that the reference-class evidence used in Shonubi's sentencing was inappropriate in light of the disutility (to society at large) of inflicting undeserved, additional prison time on Shonubi. This would not be an issue if Shonubi's guilt in smuggling a total of 2,090.2 grams of heroin were certain. The disutility becomes important when we consider the uncertainty associated with the choice of reference class on which the sentencing decision relies. Our argument is that when the probabilities themselves are uncertain (because of uncertainty over the appropriate reference class), we should proceed decision theoretically, and this involves explicitly invoking utilities.
Serious consequences demand greater degrees of epistemological warrant. On the other hand, when the stakes are low we can tolerate much higher levels of uncertainty because the consequences of being wrong aren't so grave. Either way, the utilities help determine the appropriate standard of evidence.
Uncertainty will always be prevalent in legal decisions. Mathematical models of evidence provide some relief from uncertainty but can suffer from reference-class problems. This introduces a source of meta-uncertainty, which may well be impossible to eliminate.
Decision theory, however, is in the business of recommending the best course of action in the face of uncertainty and thus can provide a valuable framework for approaching legal decisions and their associated uncertainties.
